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INTRODUCTION
1 
 
Even reason herself teaches this. For authority proceeds 
from reason, but true reason certainly does not proceed 
from authority. For every authority which is not upheld 
by true reason is seen to be weak, whereas true reason is 
kept firm and immutable by her own powers and does 
not  require  to  be  confirmed  by  the  assent  of  any 
authority.  For  it  seems  to  me  that  true  authority  is 
nothing else but the truth that has been discovered by 
the power of reason and set down in writing by the Holy 
Fathers for the use of posterity.
2 
 
This astonishing passage comes at the end of a digression on the 
relationship between authority and reason  following  Eriugena ’s 
treatment  of  the  ten  Aristotelian  categories  in  Book  I  of  the 
Periphyseon.
3 The occasion for this digression is the problem of the 
                                                                                                                    
1  I  would  like  to  express  my  gratitude  to  Eugene  Thacker  and  Nicola 
Masciandaro for their insightful and helpful comments. 
2 Johannes Scotus Eriugena,  Periphyseon, edited by  E. Jeauneau, Corpus 
Christianorum  Continuatio  Medievalis  [CCCM]  161-165  (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1996-2003), I. 3052-3059; PL 122:513B-C. Translation: Eriugena, 
Periphyseon (The Division of Nature), translated by I. P. Sheldon-Williams, 
revised by John J. O’Meara, (Montreal: Éditions Bellarmin, 1987), 110. 
Subsequent cross-references to the PL edition omit the volume number. 
3  On  Eriugena’s  treatment  of  Aristotle’s  categories  see:  C.  Erismann, 
“‘Processio  id  est  multiplicatio’:  L’influence  latine  de  l’ontologie  de 
Porphyre: le cas de Jean Scot Érigène,” Revue de Sciences philosophiques et 
théologiques LXXXVIII (2004), 401-46; J. Marenbon, “John Scottus and the GLOSSATOR 7 
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applicability of the categories of acting and suffering to God. The 
Alumnus, the student of the dialogue, is puzzled: the reasoning up 
to  that  point  would  suggest  that  these  categories,  as  well  as  the 
previous  eight,  cannot  be  applied  to  the  Creator  due  to  the 
Creator’s transcendence  to  substance. Moreover, to attribute the 
categories  of  acting  and  suffering  to  God  would  imply  that 
accidents  can  be  predicated  of  God’s  nature.  But,  on  the  other 
hand, denying the possibility of the applicability of those categories 
to  the  Creator  would  have  as  a  consequence  that  no  active  or 
passive verb could be used in the case of God. This would imply 
that the Scriptures are deceiving when they say that God is loved 
or that he loves, that he is moved or that he moves.
4  The Alumnus 
is stuck between the danger of impiety—into which he would fall by 
attributing falsehood to the Scriptures—and ridiculousness, for, as 
he admits: “if I say it is false [i.e., that God does not admit acting 
and suffering], reason itself might easily make a laughing-stock of 
me.”
5  
In  order  to  help  the  Alumnus  out  of  his  puzzlement,  the 
Nutritor, the teacher of the dialogue, begins a digression which will 
lead  him  first  to  claim  that  the  Scriptures  cannot  be  in 
contradiction with true reason, and second, that reason has priority 
over authority. At the very beginning of this digression we find a 
long quotation from Dionysius’s De divinis nominibus (I.1), whose 
authority the Nutritor paradoxically uses in order to undermine the 
supremacy of authority over reason.  
The conclusion reached by the Nutritor in agreement with the 
Alumnus,  i.e.  that  reason  has  priority  over  authority,  will 
determine the correct order of the inquiry and of the exposition: 
“And that is why  reason  must be  employed first in  our present 
business,  and  authority  afterwards.”
6  This  conclusion  is  not 
particularly  surprising,  when  one  considers  both  Eriugena’s 
                                                                                                                    
Categoriae Decem,” in Eriugena : Studien zu seinen Quellen, ed. W. Beierwaltes 
(Heidelberg:  C.  Winter,  1980),  116-34;  G.  d’Onofrio,  “‘Disputandi 
disciplina’:  Procédés  dialectiques  et  ‘logica  vetus’  dans  le  langage 
philosophique de Jean Scot,” in Jean Scot Ecrivain, ed. G.-H. Allard (Paris: 
Vrin 1986), 229-263. On space and time in particular see M. Cristiani, “Lo 
spazio e il tempo nell’opera dell’Eriugena,” Studi Medievali, 3rd series, 14 
(1973): 39-136.  
4 Periphyseon, I. 2856-2868 (PL 508C-D). 
5 Periphyseon, I. 2856-7 (PL 508 C). 
6 Periphyseon, I. 3060-1 (PL 513 C); Sheldon-Williams, 110. ARRUZZA – AUTHORITY OF REASON 
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rationalistic attitude within the dispute on predestination between 
850 and 851 and his peculiar solution to the problem of divine 
predestination and foreknowledge, which ended up causing him 
major  trouble  with  the  ecclesiastical  authorities.
7  In  the  De 
praedestinatione  liber,  Eriugena  coherently  applied  his  own 
rationalistic  interpretation  of  the  Augustinian  claim  that  true 
philosophy is true religion, and vice versa, by using the arts of the 
trivium in order to reconstruct the true meaning of the auctoritates. 
As he shows in I.1, to say that true philosophy is true religion is to 
say  that  dealing  with  philosophy  is  identical  to  clarifying  the 
correct  rules  of  the  inquiry  into  God,  where  the  boundaries 
between rational investigation into God and religious veneration of 
God are blurred.
8 Regarding the interpretive m ethodology to be 
applied, while the scriptural text or a given sentence of a Church 
Father is the starting point of the interpretive process, the end point 
is  the  outcome  of  rigorous  reasoning,  largely  resorting  to  the 
resources offered by grammar, rhetoric and dialectics. The guiding 
principle here is that whenever the  auctoritas appears to contradict 
logical reasoning, we must have fallen into an interpretive mistake, 
which can be corrected by an adequate use of the liberal arts. As 
an  index  of  this  complex  relationship  between  reason  and 
authority in Eriugena’s commentarial activity, one might see the 
fact that in the thirteenth century large excerpts of the Periphyseon 
were used as glosses to the Corpus Dionysiacum and were organized 
together  into  a  commentary  on  the  Mystical  theology.
9  In what 
follows, I will first address the question of the relationship between 
ordo  verborum  and  ordo  rerum  in  Eriugena’s  thought.  Then  I  will 
analyze  the  arguments  Eriugena  provides  in  order  to  reach  and 
                                                                                                                    
7 On the political context and content of the debate on predestination and 
of Eriugena’s intervention, see M. Cristiani, Dall’unanimitas all’universitas: 
da Alcuino a Giovanni Eriugena: lineamenti ideologici e terminologia politica della 
cultura del secolo IX (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il medioevo, 1978) 
and the introduction by E. S. Mainoldi to Giovanni Scoto Eriugena, De 
praedestinatione liber, Dialettica e teologia all’apogeo della rinascenza carolingia, 
(Florence: SISMEL – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2003). 
8  Iohannis  Scotti  de  divina  praedestinatione,  ed.  G.  Madec,  Corpus 
Christianorum Series Latina [CCSL] 50 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1978), I.1. 
9  See  J.  McEvoy,  “John  Scottus  Eriugena  and  Thomas  Gallus, 
Commentators on the Mystical Theology,” in History and Eschatology in John 
Scottus  Eriugena  and  His  Time,  eds.  M.  Dunne  and  J.  McEvoy  (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2002), 183-202. GLOSSATOR 7 
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support the claim that reason has priority over authority, paying 
particular attention to his peculiar use of the De divinis nominibus’s 
passage and of Dionysius’s authority.  
 
ORDO VERBORUM AND ORDO RERUM 
In  the  Expositiones  in  ierarchiam  coelestem  (II.  124),  Eriugena 
translates and comments on a passage from Dionysius’s De coelesti 
hierarchia  (II.1;  PG  3:137A)  in  which  Dionysius  explains  why 
intelligible  beings  in  the  Scriptures  are  represented  through 
corporeal  images  and  symbols.
10  Dionysius  argues  that  the 
Scriptures have resorted to symbols appropriate to our capacity of 
understanding and has employed them atechnōs, i.e. without technē, 
or artlessly. The adverb atechnōs refers to the simple  and artless 
way in which the Scriptures make themselves understandable to 
the  human  mind,  a  simplicity  that  Dionysius  opposes  to  the 
artificiality of rhetoric and of the liberal arts.
11 As is well known, 
Eriugena mistranslates the adverb  atechnōs as “valde artificialiter,” 
“highly  artificial,”  and  then  comments  upon  this  passage  by 
drawing a similarity between theology and poetry. Here theology 
is  presented  as  an  exercise  for  the  mind  aimed  at  an  anagogic 
development  of  reason,  progressing  from  sensible  images  to  the 
perfect knowledge of intelligible things.
12 Following Roques, this is 
much  more  than  a  simple  mistranslation  or  an  interpretative 
mistake: Eriugena is actually inverting the meaning of Dionysius ’s 
passage because he cannot accept the notion of an opposition of 
the  Scriptures  to  the  liberal  arts.  The  rules  of  the  liberal  arts, 
                                                                                                                    
10  For  the  critical  editions  of  these  works,  see  Iohannis  Scotti  Eriugenae 
Expositiones  in  Ierarchiam  Coelestem,  ed.  J.  Barbet,  CCCM  31  (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1975) and Dionysius Areopagita, De coelesti hierarchia, in Corpus 
Dyonisiacum, II, eds.  G. Heil and A. M. Ritter (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
1991). 
11 Roques stresses this opposition between divine revelation and the liberal 
arts in R. Roques, ‘Connaissance de Dieu et théologie symbolique d’après 
l’In  ierarchiam  coelestem  Sancti  Dionysii  de  Hugues  de  Saint-Victor,’  in 
Structures  théologiques  de  la  gnose  à  Richard  de  Saint-Victor  (Paris:  Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1962), 294-364. 
12 See on this W. Otten, “Religion as Exercitatio Mentis: Exegesis between 
Faith  and  Reason,”  in  Christian  Humanism.  Essays  in  Honor  of  Arjo 
Vanderjagt, eds.  A. A. MacDonald, Z. R. W. M. von Martels and J. R. 
Veenstra (Leiden: London, 2009), 65-66.  ARRUZZA – AUTHORITY OF REASON 
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indeed, are the same as the rules of intelligence
13 and, Eriugena 
later argues, there would be no Scriptures at all without the rules of 
the liberal arts.
14 These exist eternally in God ’s Wisdom and are 
the most perfect and highest image (significatio) of Christ.  
At the very beginning of the De divina praedestinatione, where 
Eriugena  deals  with  the  correct  order  of  the  argumentation,  we 
have found not only a strong praise for philosophy, but also the 
equation of true philosophy to true religion.
15 Both philosophy and 
religion, when they are true (i.e. enlightened by the intellect), share 
the same rules, so that loving wisdom is equated to striving to 
know God. Eriugena describes the different parts that constitute 
the study of wisdom (dialectics, heuristics, apodictic, and analytic)  
and  insists  on  the  justification  of  the  use  of  dialectics  in  the 
theological  domain.  The  initial  justification  for  the  resort  to 
dialectics is the usefulness of the knowledge of the rules that govern 
a correct discourse in the struggle against heretical false arguments. 
Theology, furthermore, needs dialectics both in order to defend 
itself and in order not to be helpless in front of the sophi sms and 
false syllogisms of the heretics.
16 The presupposition of this use of 
philosophy is that philosophical discourse can grasp truth  because 
reality and true philosophical knowledge have the same structure, 
and because things themselves are not different from their being 
known.  This  means  that  there  exists  the  possibility  of  a 
correspondence between ordo rerum and ordo verborum.   
The rules for a correctly articulated argument are not a pure 
invention  of  the  mind  with  no  connection  to  the  order  of  the 
world.  On  the  contrary,  such  rules  organize  universal  reality  as 
such. As stressed by Moran, the arts are conceived by Eriugena 
both as identical to the primordial causes, i.e. to the unchanging 
ideas in God’s mind, and as the faculties or powers of the human 
mind.
17 This is why they both play a mediating role between God 
and human being, and grant the possibility of true knowledge. 
Through the knowledge of the arts, a human mind can have access 
at the same time to the primordial causes of the whole reality, t o 
                                                                                                                    
13 See R. Roques, “‘Valde artificialiter’ : Le sens d’un contresens,” in Libres 
sentiers vers l’érigenisme (Roma: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1975), 45-98. 
14 Expositiones, I. 560-1; PL 140. 
15 De praed., 1. 1, 16-18. 
16 De praed., 1. 3, 45-47. 
17 D. Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in the 
Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 207. GLOSSATOR 7 
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reality as such, and to its own mind. The task of the philosopher, 
therefore,  is  to  identify  the  laws  of  reality,  the  natural  order  of 
things, and to articulate his discourse in such a way that the order 
and structure of reality can be exposed as the order and structure 
of the discourse. This also explains why heretical claims can be 
unmasked and denounced as logical mistakes. 
The notion of a correspondence between ordo rerum and ordo 
verborum is present in several passages of the  Periphyseon (see for 
example Periphyseon, II.26; II.570-571), where it is often a matter of 
carefully choosing the order of arguments and how to proceed in 
the dialogue. Whereas sometimes it seems that the choice of the 
order of the arguments is dependent on the will of the Nutritor 
(Periphyseon  I.3062,  I.3240-3241,  II.575)  or  related  to  the 
pedagogical  relationship between the master and the  student, in 
several passages the verbs used—exigo, pono, expeto—allude to a much 
more binding order (Periphyseon, I.3476-3478, II.40, II.2324-2325, 
III.2421).
18  
The fact that the recreation of the structure of the universe in 
thought  requires  the  use  of  the  liberal  arts  and  a  correct 
employment of logic indicates that a pure intellectual intuition of 
the  universal  substance  escapes  human  be ings.  As  noticed  by 
d’Onofrio,
19 Adam, in his prelapsarian condition, does have access 
to  the  pure  intellectual  contemplation  of  divine  truth   without 
needing to resort to deductions. Since in the state of grace before 
the fall everything exists in its universal form, Adam qua genus, (i.e. 
qua  universal  human  nature)  contemplates  the  genera  of  things, 
and  not  the  particulars.  It  is  opportune  to  stress  here  that  the 
prelapsarian condition of the creature is not to be understood as a 
                                                                                                                    
18 These oscillations could be explained as the sign of the coexistence of 
different  orders  (logical,  pedagogical,  and  epistemological),  which  are 
intertwined within the treatise. On this line, see G. H. Allard, “Quelques 
remarques sur la ‘disputationis series’ du ‘De divisione naturae,’” in Jean 
Scot Erigène et l’histoire de la philosophie, ed. R. Roques (Paris: Editions du 
CNRS,  1977),  211-224.  At  the  same  time  I  find  convincing  Jeauneau’s 
insistence on the strong structural unity of the treatise. Jeauneau suggests 
that Eriugena operates as an architect and adopts an helicoidal trajectory 
in order to recreate the universe, by following a descendant and ascendant 
dialectics and progressively remodeling and recreating all the conceptual 
material he touches upon: E. Jeauneau, “L’homme et l’œuvre,” in Études 
érigéniennes  (Paris: Etudes Augustinienne, 1987), 45-46. 
19 G. d’Onofrio, “‘Disputanti Disciplina’,” 246-251. ARRUZZA – AUTHORITY OF REASON 
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condition historically preceding sin, but rather as one ideally and 
ontologically  preceding  it:  the  prelapsarian  man  is  the  genus,  i.e. 
human nature created as pure of sin and in full possession of its 
intellectual  capabilities  among  the  divine  Causes.  This  idea  is 
based on Gregory of Nyssa’s distinction between the creation of 
man in the image of God, or ideal creation, and what God adds to 
this ideal creation, and to human nature, because he foresaw man’s 
sin. While in temporal terms, Adam and Eve have been created 
with  a  sexed  body  from  the  very  beginning,  yet  in  ontological 
terms, the sexuation of the bodies is an accidental addition to the 
ideal human nature as originally conceived of by God.
20   
According to Eriugena, on an ontological level, the fall i s the 
cause both of the determination of the genera via the rupture of the 
original  unity  and  the  process  of  particularization,  and  of  a 
decadence  of  human  intellectual  capacities.  This  is  why  logical 
operations of reason, guided by the intellect, are needed in order to 
grasp the original truth of the universal substance. When they are 
correct,  or,  when  reason  is  enlightened  by  the  intellect  and  not 
deceived  by  the  senses,  then  these  operations  are  capable  of 
recreating the order of the universe in thought. 
It is now clear why, on the one hand, the question of the ordo 
verborum, of the correct articulation of arguments and of the form of 
exposition, is so relevant in Eriugena’s work, and why, on the other 
hand, the liberal arts are indispensable. 
 
RATIOCINATIONIS VIOLENTIA 
The  digression  on  the  relationship  between  reason  and  the 
Scriptures begins with the Alumnus’s reference to the “violence of 
the  reasoning”  which  forces  the  Alumnus  to  make  conclusions 
seemingly in contradiction to the Scriptures. This reference to the 
ratiocinationis  violentia  is  relevant  because  it  attributes  binding 
necessity  to  the  conclusions  reached  through  the  correct  use  of 
reason.  This  necessity  is  not  disavowed,  but  rather,  even  more 
strongly asserted in the Nutritor’s answer:  
 
Do not be afraid. For now we must follow reason, which 
investigates  the  truth  of  things  and  is  not  overborne 
(opprimitur)  by  any  authority,  and  is  by  no  means 
                                                                                                                    
20 See for example, De hominis opificio, 16, 184D-185A. On this topic see C. 
Arruzza, Les mésaventures de la théodicée (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 263-268. GLOSSATOR 7 
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prevented from revealing publicly and proclaiming the 
things  which  it  [both]  zealously  searches  out  by 
circuitous reasoning and discovers with much toil.
21 
 
Responding to the Alumnus’s puzzlement, the Nutritor insists that 
ratio sequenda est, that we need to follow reason. Having stated this, 
the task of the Nutritor is to show that following reason cannot be 
in contradiction to the Scriptures. The argument articulated by the 
Nutritor can be summarized as follows: we have  two sources of 
authority,  one  is  reason,  whose  correct  use  leads  to  conclusions 
which  have  binding  necessity,  while  the  other  is  the  Scriptures, 
which hide truth in secretis sedibus, in secret places. Whenever there 
is an apparent contradiction between the correct use of reason and 
the text of the Scriptures, we need to keep in mind first, that God is 
superessential  and  because  of  his  absolute  transcendence  he 
escapes  any  possible  definition,  and  second,  that  true  reason 
teaches  us  that  whereas  affirmations  about  God  can  be  wrong, 
negations  are  never  wrong.
22  This means that the symbols and 
names used within the Scriptures need interpretati on and should 
be  understood  as  always  metaphorical  and  never  as  properly 
predicated.  
Since reason’s correct deductions play a fundamental role in 
demonstrating the necessity of negations, and therefore in granting 
a  correct  understanding  of  the  truth  hidden  under  the  symbols 
used by the Scriptures, it is clear that the Scriptures and true reason 
are  not  incompatible  but  rather,  complementary.  To  this  claim 
Eriugena also adds a metaphysical argument stating the common 
origin of authority and reason: 
 
So do not let any authority frighten you away from the 
things  which  the  rational  deduction  from  right 
contemplation teaches you. For true authority does not 
conflict  with  right  reason,  nor  right  reason  with  true 
authority, since there is no doubt that both flow from the 
same source, the Wisdom of God.
23 
 
                                                                                                                    
21  Periphyseon,  I.  2869-2873;  PL  508D-509A.  Sheldon-Williams,  105 
(translation partially modified). 
22 Periphyseon, I. 2938-2939; PL 510C. 
23 Periphyseon, I. 2973-2977; PL 511A-C. Sheldon Williams, 108. ARRUZZA – AUTHORITY OF REASON 
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Authority  and  reason,  then,  are  two  different,  but  reciprocally 
consistent  manifestations  of  the  same  divine  wisdom  that 
ontologically  undergirds  them  both.  The  Nutritor  reassures  the 
Alumnus (nulla itaque auctoritas te terreat), or rather, invites him to 
stand firm against any attempt at undermining the conclusions of 
true reason through an appeal to authority. This is apparently still 
not sufficient for the Alumnus, for despite being convinced by the 
master’s  reasoning,  he  asks  him  to  provide  more  supporting 
evidence by resorting to the authority of the Holy Fathers.
24 This 
time, however, the Nutritor refuses to comply with his student ’s 
request. The ordo verborum must correspond to the ordo rerum, and 
since reason is prior to authority in dignity and nature, “that is why 
reason  must  be  employed  first  in  our  present  business,  and 
authority afterwards.”
25  
The  Nutritor’s  argument  for  the  priority  of  reason  is  quite 
confusing. He begins by saying that what is prior by nature has 
greater  dignity  than  what  is  prior  in  time.
26  Then, referring to 
Augustine’s De ordine,
27 he states that we were taught that reason is 
prior by nature, whereas authority is prior in time. Augustine ’s 
passage  refers  to  the  correct  path  for  those  who  want  to  apply 
themselves to the study of divine things. In this passage, Augustine 
argues  that  in  the  process  of  learning  we  are  guided  both  by 
authority and by reason, but that whereas authority is prior in time, 
reason is ontologically prior (re autem ratio prior est). The temporal 
priority of authority refers to the fact that authority is the access 
door for those who want to learn. In other words, authority is the 
proper  starting  point:  whereas  simple-minded  people  content 
themselves with authority, those who want to learn apply reason to 
authority’s  teachings,  developing  their  capacity  of  reasoning 
beyond  authority’s  nursery  in  order  to  grasp  the  universal 
principles and what transcends those universal principles. 
In  Eriugena’s  passage,  however,  Augustine’s  reference  is 
followed by a commentary which overturns Augustine’s suggestion 
while pretending to be a simple explanation: 
 
                                                                                                                    
24 Periphyseon, I. 3042-44; PL 513A. 
25 Periphyseon, I. 3060-1; PL 513 C. Sheldon-Williams, 110. 
26 Periphyseon, I. 3045-6; PL 513B. 
27 Augustinus, De ordine, II.9. 26, ed. W. M. Green, CCSL 29 (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1970).  GLOSSATOR 7 
146 
We have learned that reason is prior by nature, authority 
in time. For although authority was created together with 
time, authority did not come into being at the beginning 
of nature and time, whereas reason arose with nature and 
time out of the Principle of things.
28 
 
In spite of Eriugena’s “enim”
29 and of my attempts at a charitable 
reading of this text, I cannot see how Eriugena’s statement follows 
from  Augustine’s  text.  Indeed,  in  my  view,  Eriugena  is  rather 
radically shifting the discourse from a consideration related to the 
correct pedagogical method to one  concerning the  metaphysical 
relationship  between  authority  and  reason.  On  a  metaphysical 
level, reason precedes authority also in time, in the sense that while 
reason  comes  together  with  the  beginning  of  time  and  nature, 
authority follows only later. In this way Augustine’s teaching about 
authority’s priority in time is overturned, for reason is shown to be 
prior both by nature and in time. And indeed, the conclusion of 
this  reasoning  is  that  the correct  ordo verborum  is  the  one which 
resorts first to reason and afterwards to authority. In other words, 
whereas the Alumnus’s request to provide some evidence coming 
from  the  authority  of  the  Holy  Fathers  is  consistent  with 
Augustine’s  pedagogical  suggestion,  the  Nutritor’s  conclusion  is 
not. 
 
THE FREEDOM OF THE COMMENTATOR 
After having shown the pattern of Eriugena’s argument for the 
priority  of  reason,  it  is  time  to  deal  with  his  peculiar  use  of 
Dionysius’s passage from the De divinis nominibus. At line 2891, the 
Nutritor suggests they resort to the evidence provided by Dionysus 
in order to solve the apparent contradiction between true reason 
and the Scriptures, which is puzzling the Alumnus. Yet, a few lines 
later he suggests the reorganization of Dionysius’s ordo verborum in 
order  to  make  this  difficult  and  somewhat  obscure  text  more 
understandable.
30 This apparently innocent clarification will prove 
to be not innocent at all because the reorganization of Dionysius ’s 
text corresponds to a precise argumentative strategy. 
                                                                                                                    
28 Periphyseon, I. 3048-3051; PL 513 B. Sheldon-Williams, 110. 
29 “Quamvis enim natura simul cum tempore create sit . . .” 
30 Periphyseon, I. 2896-2900; PL 509 C. ARRUZZA – AUTHORITY OF REASON 
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First, Eriugena starts quoting Dionysius’s text leaving out the 
beginning of the chapter.
31 What he leaves out, however, is not 
fortuitous,  for  in  those  lines  Dionysius  argues  that  the  truth 
established about the divine things is not established through the 
persuasive discourses of human wisdom, but rather through the 
demonstration of the divine power inspired to the holy authors by 
the Holy Spirit. Indeed, it is the divine power, which moves those 
authors, that allows a supra -rational union with God, i.e.  a union 
which transcends the limits of our narrow intellectual capacities. As 
in the case of the passage from the  De coelesti hierarchia discussed 
above,  Dionysius  seems  to  want  to  oppose  the  power  of  divine 
wisdom, and therefore the truth revealed through the inspiration 
by  divine  power,  to  the  limits  of  profane  wisdom.  Dionysius’s 
passage  is based on  1  Cor. 2:4:  “This is what we  speak, not  in 
words  taught  us  by  human  wisdom  but  in  words  taught  by  the 
Spirit, explaining spiritual realities with Spirit-taught words.” 
There is, however, no mention of this introductory passage in 
Eriugena’s  quotation  and  subsequent  commentary—an  omission 
which might reveal the same difficulty as accepting any opposition 
between the Scriptures and the liberal arts that we have already 
found in the passage from the Expositiones quoted above. 
In the passages quoted by Eriugena, Dionysius is restating the 
basic  principles  of  negative  theology,  namely,  God’s  absolute 
transcendence  with  regard  to  being  and  intellect,  and  the 
impossibility  of  attributing  any  name  to  God  in  a  proper  way. 
God’s  absolute  transcendence  is  the  reason  why  the  Scriptures 
have supreme authority and it is not allowed for human beings to 
say or think anything about God except what has been revealed to 
them by the Holy Scriptures. When he opens his commentary on 
this  passage,  Eriugena  restates  the  necessity  for  following  the 
authority of the Scriptures, arguing that this has been sufficiently 
proved by Dionysius’s words.
32 Yet, he adds immediately after: 
 
                                                                                                                    
31 The first passage quoted is De divinis nominibus I.1, 108, 6-109, 2, ed. B. 
R. Suchla, in Corpus Dionysiacum, I (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1990); PG 
3:588A2-10.  The  second  is  De  divinis  nominibus  I.1,  109,  7-110,  6;  PG 
3:588B1-C8.  
32  Periphyseon,  I.2931-2;  PL  510B:  “Haec  de  sequenda  auctoritate 
solummodo  sanctae  scripturae  in  divinis  maxime  disputationibus 
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Indeed  reason  (ratio  vero)  is  wholly  concerned  with 
suggesting,  and  proving  by  the  most  accurate 
investigations  into  the  truth,  that  nothing  can  be  said 
properly about God, since He surpasses every intellect 
and all sensible and intelligible meaning, Who is better 
known  by  not  knowing,  of  Whom  ignorance  is  true 
knowledge, Who is more truly and faithfully denied in 
all things that He is affirmed. For whatever negation you 
make about Him will be a true negation, but not every 
affirmation you make will be a true affirmation.
33 
 
Now, in Dionysius’s passage there is no mention of the role played 
by reason or its logical operations in this process. On the contrary, 
the whole text, and what follows in the subsequent chapters, insists 
on the constitutive weakness that characterizes human reason, on 
the necessity of overcoming its narrow boundaries, as well as on 
the boundaries set by language, by honoring the obscurity of the 
divine  Thearchy  through  silence.  While  Eriugena  approves  of 
Dionysius’s negative theology, he grants a crucial role to human 
wisdom and its tools by insisting on the divine origin of the liberal 
arts and of the correct logical reasoning in general. In this way he 
uses  Dionysius’s  text  for  a  purpose  that  is  significantly  different 
from the purpose for which it was originally written. Indeed, the 
apophatic approach to God appears, in Eriugena’s commentary, as 
the outcome of the rigorous application of reason and of the liberal 
arts,  which  lead  us  to  the  overcoming  of  representation:  the 
mystical contemplation of God is, then, the necessary outcome of 
an  eminently  logical  process.  It  is  certainly  true  that  Dionysius 
stresses the necessity of a correct, non-literal understanding of the 
symbols  adopted  by  the  Scriptures  in  order  to  name  God. 
However,  for  Eriugena,  the  impossibility  of  naming  God  more 
strongly  opens  a  decisive  space  for  human  reason  and  for  its 
proper tools.  
The  insistence  on  God’s  absolute  transcendence  is  the 
argumentative dispositive adopted by Eriugena in order to arrive at 
the  conclusion  that  reason  is  prior  to  authority  and  that  right 
reason and right authority cannot be in contradiction because they 
have the very same source. The impossibility of taking literally the 
names  given  to  God,  attributes,  in  Eriugena’s  commentary,  the 
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crucial role of negation to reason’s operations. This opens a space 
of radical interpretive freedom in front of the text of the Scriptures, 
a  space  which  is  the  proper  domain  of  reason’s  accurate 
investigations, for these investigations alone are entitled to discover 
and expose the hidden truth in the Scriptures. Reason’s freedom in 
this process lies in the fact that the correct conclusions of correct 
reasoning are binding (violentia  ratiocinationis), so that  in the last 
instance, reason, while honoring the Scriptures’s authority, obeys 
its  own  necessity,  i.e.  the  binding  necessity  of  truth.  This  is  the 
point of the passage at lines 3052-3059, quoted at the beginning of 
this  short  commentary.  There,  the  Alumnus  concludes  that  true 
reason  does  not  require  the  assent  of  authority,  or,  that  in  the 
moment in which it grasps the truth, it is self-sufficient and does 
not require further proof. Authority, on the contrary, requires the 
assent of reason. Of course, here the Alumnus is talking about the 
authority of the Holy Fathers, and there is a difference between the 
authority of the Scriptures and that of the Holy Fathers, for only 
the former has been shown to be absolutely binding. Nevertheless, 
the fundamental idea remains that reason is bound by the revealed 
text of the Scriptures, because this text is true, as it has its origin in 
the very divine wisdom which is the origin of human reason and of 
the  liberal  arts.  This  means  that  the  truth  of  the  Scripture  is  its 
immanence to reason and that this truth can be discovered in its 
hiding places through reason’s deductions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
By briefly commenting on this passage from the Periphyseon, I 
have tried to show Eriugena’s own freedom in using his sources, in 
this case, the short quotation from Augustine’s De ordine and the 
long passage from Book I of Dionysius’s De divinis nominibus. While 
being  in  agreement  with  Dionysius’s  insistence  on  negative 
theology,  Eriugena  uses  Dionyius’s  text  in  order  to  reassure  the 
Alumnus  that  reason  and  the  liberal  arts,  which  reason  uses  to 
carry  out  its  investigations,  are  indeed  the  prominent  source  of 
authority—a conclusion which does not belong to Dionysius’ text. 
On the basis of this conclusion, Eriugena interprets the apophatic 
climax  of  negative  theology  not  as  an  irrationalistic  move,  but 
rather as the necessary logical conclusion of correct and rigorous 
reasoning, in which reason exhausts itself and its representational 
capacities, and both authority and dialectics are suspended. Finally, 
by  quoting  and  commenting  on  this  passage  from  De  divinis GLOSSATOR 7 
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nomibus,  Eriugena  performatively  grants  to  himself  as  a 
commentator the freedom he wants to grant to reason, which lies 
in the fidelity of reason to its own necessity, the necessity of truth. 
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